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By Richard D. Friedman
rawford v. Washington should not have been
surprising. The Confrontation Clause guarantees
a criminal defendan  the right "t  be confronted
with the witnesses against him." The doctrine of Ohio
v. Roberts, treating the clause as a general proscription
against the admission of hearsay-except hearsay that
fits within a "firmly rooted" exception or is otherwise
deemed reliable-had so little to do with the constitu-
tional text, or with the history or principle behind it,
that eventually it was bound to be discarded. And the
appeal of a testimonial approach to the clause seemed
sufficiently strong to yield high hopes that ultimately
the Supreme Court would adopt it. After all, on its face
the clause establishes a categorical, unqualified right to
be confronted with the adverse "witnesses," and wit-
nesses are those who give testimony. Plainly, the clause
was meant to ensure that prosecution witnesses give
their testimony face to face with the accused.
The oral argument of Crawford suggested that as
many as seven justices would agree to the testimonial
approach. And that is what happened. Despite Justice
Scalia's protestation at argument that he would be
unwilling to adopt the approach if it left significant
problems to be resolved in the future, his dramatic
majority opinion wisely avoided deciding more than
necessary. It did not offer a comprehensive definition of
what statements should be considered testimonial in
nature, because it did not have to: Sylvia Crawford's
videotaped statement to the police, made the night of
the incident at issue, qualified under any conceivable
definition.
I suppose I should not have been surprised that pros-
ecutors would work energetically to limit the impact of
Crawford. But I do confess to being surprised by the
willingness of many judges to go along. One particular
incident illustrates the point well. In the summer 2004
issue of its journal, Juvenile and Family Justice Today,
the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges published an article saying, essentially, that
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Mostly Unpleasant
Crawford could be ignored in domestic violence cases
by treating excited utterances as non-testimonial. Jeff
Fisher, my colleague Bridget McCormack, and I wrote
a brief, responsive essay, saying that a faithful applica-
tion of Crawford required treating as testimonial many
statements that had previously been admitted by char-
acterizing them as excited utterances. Did the council
welcome this differing point of view from three
observers who had been on the winning side of
Crawford? It did not. It rejected our essay on the sup-
posed ground that its tone was unacceptable-which
mystified me, especially because I offered to make any
tonal changes necessary. More about this incident, and
the suppressed essay, may be found under the heading
A Case of Censorship? on "The Confrontation Blog"
(which I maintain) at www.confrontationright.blog
spot.com.
The more important manifestation of this circle-the-
wagons approach, of course, lies in judicial opinions.
Crawford identified a core set of statements that are
clearly testimonial-but some courts have treated this
set as if it is exhaustive. Crawford said that "interroga-
tions by law enforcement officers fall squarely within"
the class of testimonial statements-but some courts
have acted as if only such statements are testimonial (as
if an affidavit shoved under the courthouse door would
not be testimonial). Crawford said that "Sylvia's
recorded statement, knowingly given in response to
structured police questioning, qualifies under any con-
ceivable definition" of interrogation-but some courts
have acted as if only such questioning constitutes inter-
rogation. Crawford contrasted two polar situations, "a
formal statement to government officers" and "a casual
remark to an acquaintance"-and some courts have
acted as if a statement not made formally, or not made
to government officers, cannot be testimonial, no matter
how clear was the anticipation that the statement would
be used in prosecuting crime.
All these courts treat as testimonial only those state-
ments that bear a close resemblance to in-court testimo-
ny. But that is precisely wrong. As some courts have
recognized, the point of the Confrontation Clause was
to ensure that testimony be given at trial, or at some
other formal adversarial proceeding, in the presence of
the defendant. It makes no sense, therefore, to say that
a statement does not fit within the clause because it
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does not resemble trial testimony. If a statement is
made with the anticipation that it will be used in inves-
tigating or prosecuting crime, lack of the characteristics
of trial testimony does not make the statement nontesti-
monial; rather, it means that the statement is unaccept-
able as a form of testimony.
I have been pleasantly surprised by one aspect of
the post-Crawford judicial reaction. I believe that if
the judge in a homicide case finds as a preliminary
matter that the accused killed the victim, the accused
should be deemed to have forfeited the confrontation
right, thus allowing the victim's dying statement to be
admitted. This is a difficult, even counterintuitive theo-
ry, but several courts have accepted it, presumably rec-
ognizing how much preferable it is to reading the odd
"dying declaration" hearsay exception into the con-
frontation right.
The willingness of courts to embrace forfeiture theo-
ry has one feature in common with their tendency to
view the meaning of "testimonial" narrowly: They both
favor the prosecution. And I suppose that means these
should not be surprises at all. U
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